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Abstract—In this paper, we describe an attack against one of 
the Oblivious-Transfer-based blind signatures scheme, proposed 
in [1]. An attacker with a primitive capability of producing 
specific-range random numbers, while exhibiting a partial MITM 
behavior, is able to corrupt the communication between the 
protocol participants. The attack is quite efficient as it leads to a 
protocol communication corruption and has a sound-minimal 
computational cost. We propose a solution to fix the security flaw. 
 
Index Terms—Oblivious Transfer, blind signatures. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
BLIVIOUS TRANSFER (OT) constitutes a powerful tool used 
today in modern cryptography. In the first introduction of 
the 21OT  mechanism by Rabin [2], it is assumed that in a 
communication system, Alice transmit to Bob a two-part 
message, where only the one part is the secret that Alice wants 
to share. From Bob’s side, Bob does not know which one of 
the two is the real secret, so he selects one of them with 
probability ½ of success (or ½ of failure). 
In the related bibliography, OT based security protocols [3] 
[4] that aim to guarantee a variety of security properties such 
as anonymity or privacy of the participants, especially when 
OT is combined with other cryptographic primitives, e.g. blind 
signatures [5]. Through these works, OT has been involved 
into several improvements regarding efficiency and of the OT-
based communication systems. The basic 21OT , described 
above, has been replaced by mechanisms of 1
nOT  shown in 
[3], where the Sender dispatch N message to the Chooser, and 
the Chooser selects the appropriate message without knowing 
the initial selection of the Sender.  
In reports [6] and [7], the OT mechanism is combined with 
various cryptographic techniques, in order to provide the 
involved participants with even more security guarantees. OT 
is combined with signature schemes providing strong fairness, 
anonymity and privacy of the communication. Both of the 
reports also provide a detailed analysis of the protocol in terms 
of anonymity and privacy. There are also reports like [8], 
where security threats over the OT-based protocol schemes 
have been classified into high and low cost attacks. All these 
kinds of security threats are managed to succeed regarding the 
computational cost of the encryption used between the 
protocols’ participants, where an adversary is consider 
containing the maximum computational power, performing a 
variety of attack actions. 
In this paper, we present an attack against the OT-based 
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double blind signature scheme protocol described in [1]. More 
precisely, we show that a partial MITM intruder with a low 
computational cost can corrupt the protocol’s communication 
by integrity violating one of the protocols’ exchanged 
messages (by tagging specific random numbers). As a result 
the protocols’ agents will accept the corruption occurred, 
which misinterprets the overall communication. 
II. THE OT-BASED BLIND SIGNATURE PROTOCOL 
This paper focuses on the analysis of a variant 1-out-of-n 
Oblivious Transfer ( 1
nOT ) based on blind signatures protocol. 
The specific protocol incorporates a blind mechanism from 
both the Sender’s and the Chooser’s side. To achieve 
cryptographic efficiency the protocol involves a series of 
security perspectives such as public key cryptography, blind 
signatures and a keyed hash function. A random number 
generator for both of the participants is also used in order to 
overcome predictability attacks caused by an Intruder. The 
following notation is used throughout the paper:   
N RSA modulus 
{ 0 1,..., nS S  } Sender posses initially n secret strings Si   
σ  Chooser posses initially an integer σ [0.. 1]n   
H Pre-agreed Hash Function 
,SK N d   Secret Key 
,PK N e   Public Key 
{ 0 1,..., nU U  } Random numbers *0 1,...,  n NU U Z    
( )SP  Secure padding scheme for RSA 
C Random number *NC Z  
R  Random number *NR Z  
Y  Blind Signature for the Sender 
0.. 1j nK    Encryption Keys for the Sender 
  XOR operator 
d1>>d2 Right shift-bit operator  
The Sender has n input secret strings, { 0 1,..., nS S  } and the 
Chooser’s input is an integer σ [0.. 1]n  . Because of 
the 1
nOT , the Chooser should learn a secret S and nothing on 
any other { 0 1,..., nS S  }-{ S }. On the other hand, the Sender 
should learn nothing about . The protocol described here 
provides unconditional protection for the Chooser and 
computational protection in the random oracle model for the 
Sender. Due to the OT operability, the specific protocol may 
be often invoked multiple times between the participants. 
The basic steps of the described protocol are illustrated in 
Fig.1 and can be summarized as follows: 
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Fig. 1. The Double Blind Protocol Scheme Based on Oblivious Transfer 
 
1) Initially the Sender picks n random numbers 
{ 0 1,..., nU U  } and the Chooser inputs an integer σ over the 
range [0.. 1]n  . Then, Sender selects his RSA keys and sends 
them along with the set of its numbers to the Chooser. 
2) Upon the first message is receipted, the Chooser will 
randomly (according to σ ) select a number U  and compute 
the ( )SP U , which in turn, it is blinded with a random selected 
number C, in order to produce ( ) eSP U C  . He then sends the 
message to Sender. 
3) When the Sender receives the second message, he 
randomly selects his blind factor R (random number). Then he 
signs (with SK<N, d>) and blinds (with R) the message, 
creating {( ( ) ) }e dY SP U C R    . On the next step, the Sender 
creates jK keys with 0.. 1j n   using the pre-agreed hash 
function H. Those keys will be used to encrypt all the n string 
secret messages { 0 1,..., nS S  } using the  operator. 
4) Once the Sender completes the encryption, 
of 0.. 1{ } { }
Enc
j j j j nS K S    , he dispatches the third message 
to the Chooser, which contains the blind signature Y  and the 
encrypted set of messages{ }EncjS . At this point Sender 
accomplishes his participation to the protocol. 
5) Chooser receives the third message and moves on to un-
blinding Y with
1C  . While acquiring 1 ( )dY C SP U R 
   , 
he uses his initial choice σ to compute the appropriate K for 
revealing only the S secret message. K will be computed by 
applying the hash function H to the remaining ( )dSP U R  , 
resulting  to (( ( ) ), )dK H SP U R    . 
6) Once K has been computed, the Chooser will apply it 
into the encrypted set of messages{ }EncjS obtaining at a final 
stage, S  by { }
EncS K S    , and thus completing the 
protocol. At this point, the Chooser will have knowledge of 
S without being able to know anything else of the set{ }
Enc
jS . 
As a security-consequence of the protocol’s completion, the 
outcome will be the preservation of information-theoretic 
privacy for the Sender and computational privacy for the 
Chooser according to [1]. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 
Similar security analysis reports, such as [8], have indicated 
security threats that may be launched in OT-based 
communication systems. The majority of them are based over 
an intruder that eavesdrop all the protocols’ messages, 
containing also a degree of computational power that may 
reveal to him, previously unknown information. 
An Intruder may launch a series of actions that could lead 
the protocols’ participants into security failures, such as a DoS 
attack from the Chooser’s side, or impersonations using 
previously recorded Sender’s messages in other (same 
protocol) sessions. While the protocol avoids those kinds of 
attacks by using double-blind signatures for both of its 
participants, it may allow Intruder’s integrity violations, by 
leading to a corrupt communication. In the rest of this section, 
we present the attack where an Intruder, being placed as a 
MITM entity may corrupt the proposed protocol.  
A. Description of the Attack 
The necessary prerequisites for the Intruder are the following: 
a) The Intruder is a MITM entity among the protocols’ 
participants that eavesdrops all the messages, b) he has the 
ability of generating random numbers over a specific range of 
values and c) he can concatenate previously intercepted 
messages with data that he has created. Fig. 2 provides a 
detailed description of the attack mounted against the protocol. 
 3 
 
Fig. 2. The proposed attack 
 
The proposed attack is described as follows:  
1) In the first step, the Intruder leaves the first message 
uninterrupted to reach its intended destination. Chooser upon 
receipt of the message, selects, under uniform probability 
distribution, a number U  according to his input σ that he had 
initially chosen; then he generates random number C blinding 
( )SP U to form the second message. 
2) Through a compromised channel, the Intruder receives 
the second message ( ) eSP U C  originated from the Chooser. 
Then, the Intruder, using a random number generator, corrupts 
the message with a random number *IV Z  creating 
( ) ( )
e I
IC V Ce IISP U C V SP U C 
     . The Sender will then 
create ( ( ) )I dSP U C  , blinding it with 
*
NR Z , having 
* *( ) ( )I N I NC R Z V C Z     , with the overall signature 
being {( ( ) ) }I I dY SP U C R    . 
3) Producing the appropriate keys 0.. 1j nK   , the corrupted 
product will be intersected into the (( ( ) ( ) )d dj IH SP U V R   
creating falsie IjK s. As a consequence, the encrypted set 
{ }EncjS will be encrypted using the wrong keyset.  
4) Sender dispatches message 3I to the Intruder who from 
his side, computes again a random ( ) ,IV
   down-blinding 
signature IY to ( )IVI IIY Y

 
 with dIC V  . Additionally, 
the Intruder sets {{ } }Enc IjS   
'{{ } }EncjS  ={{ } }
Enc II
jS  using a 
previously intercepted set of '{{ } }EncjS , forwarding the new 
message 3II to the Chooser.  
5) Chooser un-blinds signature IIY with 1C   in order to 
calculate from his side the right key K (false 
IK ) to decrypt 
his initial choice Sσ. Due to the previous Intruder’s operation, 
Chooser manages to decrypt the wrong Sσ ( ( )IIIS ) without 
knowing it, and thus accepting the corruption made.  
IV. FIXING THE FLAW AND CONCLUSION 
When exchanging the second and the third message, the 
participants may re-use the already implemented hash function 
H which is predetermined by the protocols’ specifications 
upon the agents. While sealing eC  with the ( , )ef C   
where f  is the keyed hash function of H from the Chooser’s 
side, and ( , )Rf Y R from the Sender’s side, any alteration 
made to the exchanged messages will be discarded. Such an 
optimization requires one more of execution of the keyed hash 
function for both of the participants when the protocol is 
completed, in order to identify possible intruder corruptions. 
The presented OT-based blind signature schemes have been 
adopted in systems such as e-auctions and online-gaming, 
where privacy remains the first objective. However, such 
communication prototypes have to provide, at the end, 
accuracy of the delivered services, when the protocol finalizes.  
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